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ABSTRACT 
Nowadays, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are used in a wide range of application scenarios ranging 
from structural monitoring to health-care, from surveillance to industrial automation. Most of these 
applications require forms of secure communication. On the other hand, security has a cost in terms of 
reduced performance.  In this paper we refer to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and investigate the impact of 
the 802.15.4 security sub-layer on the WSN performance. Specifically, we analyze the impact that security 
mechanisms and options, as provided by the standard, have on the overall WSN performance, in terms of 
latency, goodput, and energy consumption. To this end, we develop an analytical model and a security-
enabled simulator. We also use a real testbed, based on a complete open-source implementation of the 
standard, to validate simulation and analytical results, as well as to better understand the limits of the 
current WSN technology. 
KEYWORDS: IEEE802.15.4; security; performance evaluation; wireless sensor network. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
IEEE 802.15.4 is a standard for low-rate wireless personal area networks with a focus on 
enabling low power devices, personal area networks, and wireless sensor networks (WSNs). 
The standard is characterized by maintaining a high level of simplicity, allowing for low cost 
and low power implementations [20]. IEEE 802.15.4 is adopted in a wide range of 
application scenarios ranging from structural monitoring to health-care, from military 
surveillance to industrial automation. Most of these applications require forms of secure 
communication. For this reason, IEEE 802.15.4 specification includes a number of security 
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 provisions and options that constitute the security sub-layer [20]. The security sub-layer 
provides link-level security services by guaranteeing confidentiality and/or authenticity and 
replay detection on a per-frame basis. Specifically, it provides two security parameters, the 
security level — which specifies one (out of eight) possible security service — and the key 
identifier mode — which specifies one (out of four) possible way to store and lookup 
cryptographic keys.  
Security and performance of IEEE 802.15.4 have been thoroughly analyzed. For 
instance, a performance analysis of IEEE 802.15.4 without considering security has been 
performed in a number of papers, including [26][29][34]. In addition, a security analysis of 
IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer — its services, vulnerabilities, and related countermeasures 
— has been presented in [14][35][40]. However, a thorough analysis of the impact that the 
security sub-layer has on the overall IEEE 802.15.4 performance is missing. Some related 
works have been presented but they focus on specific aspects. For example, 
[7][14][18][25][27][40][43] deal with the cost for the sensor node of using off-the-shelf 
ciphers, encryption modes, and authentication algorithms in terms of energy, storage and 
computing overhead. Other works focus on the cost of key establishment, an important 
although collateral aspect [1][11][28][29]. However, what it is really missing is a thorough 
analysis providing quantitative indications regarding the impact that the security sub-layer 
has on the overall standard performance. We believe that this analysis is crucial. Security and 
performance compete for the same system resources, namely memory, CPU, bandwidth and 
energy, which are scarce in low power, low cost sensor devices. Therefore, quantitative 
indications regarding resource consumption are fundamental to design and implement 
adequate performance-security trade-offs in IEEE 802.15.4-based applications. 
In this paper we present a performance analysis of the IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer. 
In particular, we evaluate the impact of security levels and key identification modes on 
 network performance indices such as latency, goodput, and energy consumption. The 
objective of our analysis is twofold. On the one hand, we aim at evaluating how security 
impacts on network performance, i.e., how security services (e.g., confidentiality and/or 
authenticity and replay detection) and security options (e.g., the length of the message 
authentication code) influence performance. On the other hand, we aim at devising a cost 
model that allows designers and implementers to carry out, for example at pre-deployment, 
simulation and/or performance analysis that include security too. 
IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer provides its services to above network and application 
layers. Although IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer is the natural choice for ZigBee [45], 
nevertheless this is not the only option. Actually, different network and/or application 
protocols, can be deployed on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer [17]. For this reason we 
have chosen to evaluate the performance of the IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer in isolation, 
irrespective of the actual network or application protocols that will be layered on top of it, so 
as to give our work a wider and more general scope. 
We claim that our work has the following merits. First, we show that i) securing traffic 
has performance costs due the increased length of a secured frame and the additional 
computations required for security processing; and, ii) these costs depend on the chosen 
security parameters. Second, we show that the highest cost has to be paid when we switch 
from unsecured to secured traffic. However, when traffic is secured via hardware-based 
cryptography, the chosen security service has little, or even negligible, impact on 
performance. Conversely, when traffic is secured via software-based cryptography the 
performance penalty strongly depends on the chosen security level. Third, we propose a 
simple yet effective analytical model that we also use to extend an Ns2-based simulator of the 
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC protocol. The model and the extended simulator have been 
experimentally validated by means of real measurements carried out on an open-source 
 implementation of the IEEE 802.15.4 for TinyOS on Tmote Sky motes [8][22]. Finally, the 
availability of an open source implementation of the standard has allowed us to evaluate the 
memory overhead related to the security sub-layer. We show that while the code 
implementing the sub-layer has limited memory occupancy, the internal data structures may 
constitute a constraint to the system scalability. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that analyzes the performance of the 
IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer through analysis, simulation and experimental 
measurements, and achieves the aforementioned results. The closest work to ours is [14]. 
However, in this work Chen et al. present a performance analysis that is only based on 
simulations and lacks of any experimental validation. In addition, they neglect the impact of 
the key identifier mode, and refer to a partial implementation of the security sub-layer that 
fails to capture the memory costs and the consequent constraints on the system scalability.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related works. Section 3 provides 
an overview of the standard focusing, in particular, on the CSMA/CA access protocol. The 
IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer services are presented in Section 3.1. Section 4 presents our 
performance evaluation. More precisely, Section 4.1 presents the analytical model of the 
costs of security in terms of latency, goodput and energy consumption. In Section 4.2 we 
extend a Ns2-based simulator by means of the analytical model. In Section 4.3 we 
experimentally evaluate memory consumption of the IEEE 802.15.4 security sublayer. 
Finally, in Section 5 we draw some conclusions.  
2 RELATED WORK 
Security of IEEE 802.15.4 has been largely investigated. Many works have focused on the 
analysis of the security services offered by the IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer, its 
vulnerabilities, the possible attacks and related countermeasures. Among them, relevant 
 examples are [35][40][42]. In addition to this, another branch of research has focused on the 
impact of security on performance. For instance, several works have investigated the cost of 
using off-the-shelf ciphers, encryption modes, and authentication algorithms on wireless 
sensor nodes in terms of energy consumption, storage and computing overhead. Relevant 
examples are [7][16][18][23][25][27]. However, none of these works focuses on the 
performance implications of the standard security sub-layer.  
Xiao et al. and Zhu et al. explored first the impact of security on IEEE 802.15.4 
performance [40][43]. However, these works greatly differ from ours for several reasons. 
They both investigate the cost of a software implementation of the ciphers, encryption modes, 
and authentication algorithms. Such an investigation only focuses on the performance 
implications on a single node. In contrast, we refer to more efficient sensor node architectures 
where cryptographic transformations are applied at the hardware level by the communication 
device. Furthermore, we focus on the overall wireless sensor network performance rather 
than on a single node. Last, but not the least, we refer to the current version of the standard 
(released in 2006 [20]) whereas both [40] and [43] refer to the 2003 version [19]. The two 
versions greatly differ in the security sub-layer. 
The closest work to ours is certainly [14]. Like us, Chen et al. refer to the 2006 version of 
the standard and evaluate the impact of the security sub-layer on the overall network 
performance. They mainly focus on the influence of the packet size and inter-arrival time, 
whereas we mainly focus on the impact of the security level and the key identification mode. 
In addition, there are other strong differences. First of all, like [40][43], Chen et al. consider 
an incomplete implementation of the security sub-layer. Actually, their implementation is 
limited to the cryptographic transformations but completely neglects the data structures 
required by the security sub-layer and, consequently, their impact on memory consumption. 
Therefore, they fail to capture an important factor limiting to the overall scalability. As we 
 consider a complete implementation, we are able to capture such a scalability issue 
(Section 4.3). Furthermore, they only consider a software implementation of AES-128 [15], 
the block cipher at the basis of the cryptographic transformations. More in details, they only 
refer to 20-byte payload frames and consider a 26 ms per-block encryption/decryption delay, 
a particularly large value derived in a previous work [32]. Instead, we consider several 
payload sizes (namely 2, 18, and 80 bytes), and use both hardware-based and software-based 
cryptography. Specifically, we consider an hardware-based cryptography supported by the 
CC2420 communication device [36] and a software-based cryptography based on an 
implementation of AES-128 from the TinyOS security algorithms repository [39]. From our 
experiments it turns out that hardware-based cryptography accounts for an approximately 
constant overhead of 1.4 ms. Furthermore, software-based cryptography introduces an initial 
computing delay of 0.74 ms for key scheduling and an additional computing delay of 1.93 ms 
for each encrypted/decrypted block (Section 4.1.3). It follows that performance indicators 
reported by Chen et al. in [14] result about one order of magnitude larger than ours in the 
case of software-based cryptography and two orders of magnitude larger in the case of 
hardware-based cryptography (See Sections 4.1 and 4.2). Finally, Chen et al.’s analysis is 
only based on simulation without any experimental validation of the results. The only 
measurements account for the cost of software cryptography but they come from a previous 
paper [32]. In contrast, we present an analytical model, an extended simulator, and a set of 
experiments on real sensor nodes validating both the analytical and simulation results. 
A preliminary performance evaluation of the IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer was 
presented by the authors in [9]. The present work largely extends the previous workshop 
paper [9] from several standpoints. First, this paper completes and integrates the experimental 
evaluation in [9] by also considering latency and per-packet energy consumption. 
Furthermore, this paper considers both hardware-based and software-based encryption 
 whereas [9] only considers hardware-based encryption. Finally, this paper presents and 
validates both an analytical and a simulation cost model whereas [9] only focuses on an 
experimental evaluation. 
Using security mechanisms requires establishing the cryptographic keys to be used by the 
encryption algorithms. However, the IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer does not specify any 
key establishment scheme and, for this reason, we will not discuss this issue any further in 
the rest of the paper. Notwithstanding, it is important to notice here that, due to the limited 
resources and the large scale of a WSN, the key management schemes for desktop- and 
server-computing are generally not suitable. Therefore, key management and its performance 
in WSNs has become a very active research topic [6][41]. Many key management schemes 
have been proposed and evaluated, that are ready to use in IEEE 802.15.4 [1][2][6][30]. 
Relevant examples are [11][12][13][44]. 
Finally, we would like to spend a comment on [24]. TinySec is not compliant with IEEE 
802.15.4. Actually, it can be considered an alternative solution to link-level security. 
However, from a performance point of view, Karloff et al. achieve similar conclusions as 
ours. Namely, much of the overhead can be fully explained by the increased packet length 
and additional computations that security imposes.  
3 IEEE 802.15.4: AN OVERVIEW 
In this section we provide an overview of the standard, with special focus on the CSMA/CA 
access protocol. The reader may refer to the standard [20] for further details.  
IEEE 802.15.4 is a standard for low-rate, low-power Personal Area Networks (PANs). 
The standard defines two different types of device, namely Reduced-Function Devices 
(RFDs) and Full-Function Devices (FFDs). RFDs are intended to perform simple operations 
and typically feature minimal resources in terms of memory, storage and processing 
 capabilities. In contrast, FFDs may have more resources and can fulfil network management 
tasks. A device may play one of the following roles: ordinary device, coordinator, or PAN 
coordinator. An RFD can only be an ordinary device, whereas an FFD can play any role. A 
network may have one or more coordinators but only one PAN coordinator that is selected 
among the coordinators. A coordinator is responsible to manage a subset of ordinary nodes 
by relaying messages among them. In order to communicate, ordinary nodes must associate 
with a coordinator. IEEE 802.15.4 supports two network topologies, namely star, and peer-
to-peer. The former one is single-hop whereas the latter is multi-hop. Also, the standard 
defines two channel access modes: beacon-enabled and nonbeacon-enabled. In the beacon-
enabled mode, the PAN coordinator periodically broadcasts beacon frames to synchronize 
channel access. In contrast, in the non-beacon enabled mode, coordinators do not emit beacon 
frames and devices transmit frames without waiting for beacons. In this paper we focus on 
the beacon-enabled mode.  
 
Figure 1. Structure of a superframe 
With reference to Figure 1, in the beacon-enabled mode, two consecutive beacons bound 
a superframe. A superframe is divided into superframe slots whose duration is 320 μs. All 
operations are slot-aligned. A superframe has an active portion and an optional inactive 
portion. The PAN coordinator can switch to low-power mode during the inactive portion.  
 The active portion of a superframe may be divided in two periods, the Contention Access 
Period (CAP) and, optionally, the Contention Free Period (CFP). The Contention Access 
Period starts immediately after the beacon. The Contention Free Period, if present, goes from 
the end of the Contention Access Period to the end of the active portion. The Contention Free 
Period consists in a collection of Guaranteed Time Slots (GTSs) that are allocated by the 
PAN coordinator to requesting devices in order to let them access the medium without 
contention. In the paper we will focus on the Contention Access Period. 
In the Contention Access Period sensor nodes use the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol to access the shared communication medium and 
avoid collisions. The access protocol is organized in backoff stages. Initially, a sensor node 
waits for a random backoff interval, which is a time interval multiple of the superframe slot. 
At the end of this waiting, the sensor node performs two consecutive Clear Channel 
Assessment (CCA) operations, to ascertain that the channel is free. If the channel is found 
busy at least once, the sensor node starts another backoff stage with a longer backoff period 
(if the maximum allowed number of backoff stages is exceeded the frame is dropped). 
Specifically, the backoff window is doubled at each back stage, unless the maximum allowed 
value has been reached. On the contrary, if the channel is found free twice, the sensor node 
sends the data frame and waits for the related ACK frame. Upon receiving a frame correctly, 
the recipient replies with an ACK without contention. If the ACK is not received within a 
predefined time interval, the sender retransmits the data frame (unless the maximum number 
of retransmissions has been exceeded).  
3.1 IEEE 802.15.4 SECURITY SUB-LAYER 
The IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer optionally provides link-layer security services to 
the higher layers. In general, link-layer security secures the wireless link and allows 
applications to function at least as securely as they would do over a wired network. It follows 
that link-layer security allows a seamless integration of wireless networks into existing wired 
 networks and provides the greatest ease of deployment among currently available network 
cryptographic approaches [4]. Furthermore, specifically in a WSN, link-layer security 
supports in-network processing, passive participation and local broadcast to save traffic and 
reduce energy [10][24][33]. The two other alternatives, namely end-to-end security at the 
application layer and end-to-end security at the transport layer, provide a high layer of 
security but require a complex setup of cryptographic keys, and neither guarantee seamless 
integration nor support in-network processing, passive participation and local broadcast. Of 
course, link-layer security and end-to-end security mechanisms can co-exist. Security at 
multiple places in the protocol stack is not necessarily considered harmful and constitutes a 
means to respond to demand for more security with yet more sophisticated use of 
cryptography [4][33].  
The IEEE 802.15.4 sub-layer guarantees data confidentiality, data authenticity and replay 
detection on a per-frame basis. ACK frames are not secured. A frame can be secured 
according to security levels. Specifically, three different security levels are defined: the CTR 
security level provides confidentiality; the CBC-MAC security level provides authentication; 
and, finally, the CCM security level provides authentication and confidentiality. Furthermore, 
all security levels provide replay detection. In order to implement the cryptographic 
transformations required by the security levels, the standard uses the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) block cipher [15]. AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits and a variable key 
size of 128, 192, or 256 bits. IEEE 802.15.4 uses 128-bits keys only. 
IEEE 802.15.4 does not define any key establishment schemes, which are entrusted to the 
higher layers. In practice, the standard assumes that both senders and recipients pre-share 
common security settings and store the needed security material before secure 
communications can actually take place. However, IEEE 802.15.4 provides four Key 
Identifier Modes to identify and retrieve a cryptographic key to secure/unsecure a frame.  
 
  
Figure 2. Auxiliary Security Header. 
An unsecured frame is composed of four fields, namely a Mac Header (7–23 bytes), and 
a variable length Payload (0–118 bytes) and a Frame Check Sequence (FCS, 2 bytes). A 
secured frame contains an additional header called the Auxiliary Security Header (ASH), 
which carries the information required for security processing and frame securing/unsecuring 
and unsecuring. In a secured frame, the ASH is placed next to the standard MAC header 
(Figure 2). The ASH is a 5–14 byte data structure composed of three fields: i) the Security 
Control Header (1 byte) which specifies the security level (3-bits SecLevel sub-field) and the 
Key Identifier Mode (2-bits KeyIdMode sub-field); ii) the Frame Counter (4 bytes) for the 
anti-replay service; and, finally, iii) the Key Identifier Field (0–9 bytes) that contains 
information to identify the key to unsecure a frame. The Auxiliary Security Header ASH is 
transmitted in the clear but it can be authenticated as described in the following. 
  
A: CTR security level 
 
 
B: CBC-MAC security level 
 
C: CCM security level 
Figure 3. Security levels 
Security levels are depicted in Figure 3. The CTR security level secures a frame by 
encrypting its payload in the counter mode (Figure 3.A). As a rule of thumb, the CTR 
security level requires a block cipher encryption operation for each block to encrypt. The 
CBC-MAC security level secures a frame by authenticating the frame header, the auxiliary 
security header ASH, and the payload (Figure 3.B). The CBC-MAC security level initially 
computes a 128-bit Message Integrity Code (MIC) by using the AES block cipher in the 
cipher-block-chaining mode. Then, the MIC is truncated and appended to the frame. The 
MIC can be truncated at 4, 8 or 16 bytes, so leading to three variations of CBC-MAC of 
increasing security, namely CBC-MAC-4, CBC-MAC-8, and CBC-MAC-16, respectively. 
 As a rule of thumb, the CBC-MAC security level requires a block cipher encryption 
operation for each block to authenticate. Finally, the CCM security level secures a frame by 
using the AES block cipher in the counter with CBC-MAC mode (Figure 3.B). The CCM 
Security level initially authenticates the frame header, the ASH, and the payload as in the 
CBC-MAC security level. Like the CBC- MAC security level, the MIC can be truncated at 4, 
8, or 16 bytes so producing three variations of the CCM of increasing security, namely CCM-
4, CCM-8, and CCM-16, respectively. Finally, CCM security level encrypts the resulting 
MIC and the payload in the counter mode. As a rule of thumb, the CCM security level 
requires one block cipher encryption operation per each block of encrypted or authenticated 
fields (i.e. frame header, ASH and MIC) and two encryption operations for the payload, that 
is both authenticated and encrypted. 
TABLE I. SECURITY LEVELS 
Security level Confidentiality Authentication 
Replay 
detection 
MIC size 
(bytes) 
CTR ON OFF ON – 
CBC-MAC-4 OFF ON ON 4 
CBC-MAC-8 OFF ON ON 8 
CBC-MAC-16 OFF ON ON 16 
CCM-4 ON ON ON 4 
CCM-8 ON ON ON 8 
CCM-16 ON ON ON 16 
 
Table I gives an overview of the security levels. For each security level, the table 
specifies the security services it provides (i.e. “Confidentiality,” “Authentication,” and 
“Replay detection”). If a security level introduces a MIC, column “MIC size” specifies the 
corresponding length in bytes. 
  
A: KeyIDMode0 
 
B: KeyIDMode1 
 
C: KeyIDMode2 
 
D: KeyIDMode3 
Figure 4. Format of ASH as a function of the key identifier mode. 
Figure 4 shows the format of the Auxiliary Security Header (ASH), depending on the key 
identifier mode. In the case of Key Identifier Mode 0 (KeyIdMode0), ASH does not include 
any Key Identifier Field and security operations rely on a pre-shared static default key 
(Figure 2.A). In the case of Key Identifier Mode 1 (KeyIdMode1), the Key Identifier Field 
contains the Key Index sub-field only (1 byte). In the case of Key Identifier Modes 2 and 3 
(KeyIdMode2 and KeyIdMode3), the Key Identifier Field contains both the Key Index and 
Key Source subfields. The Key Source Subfield is four bytes in the KeyIdMode2 and eight 
bytes in the KeyIdMode3.  Table II reports the size of the Auxiliary Security Header (ASH) 
as a function of the key identifier mode. 
 
 TABLE II. AUXILIARY SECURITY HEADER (ASH) SIZE VS. KEY IDENTIFIER MODE (KEYIDMODE). 
KeyIdMode 
ASH size 
(bytes) 
0 5 
1 6 
2 10 
3 14 
 
3.1.1 Security operations 
The standard specifies a number of security operations, namely the security procedures and 
sub-procedures. A thorough and detailed description of these operations is beyond the scope 
of this paper (the interested reader may directly refer to the standard [20]), however, in this 
section, we give a very concise description of the operations so as to convey the intuition of 
the computations they carry out and the computing overhead they imply. In particular, we 
highlight that security operations involve not only cryptographic transformations but also 
management operations, such as frame parsing and data structure lookups. 
The standard considers two main security procedures, the outgoing frame security 
procedure, performed on the sending side upon frame transmission, and the incoming frame 
security procedure, performed on the receiving side upon frame reception. These procedures 
exploit two main data structures, the Key Table and the Device Table. The Key Table stores 
the cryptographic keys used by the node as well as information about the usage of these keys. 
Typically the Key Table is accessed using the pair (Key Source, Key Index) as search key to 
retrieve the cryptographic key identified by such a pair, the list of nodes using such a key, 
and the types of frames (beacon, data, command) to be protected by means of such a key. The 
Device Table records the devices with which the node is communicating. Typically, the 
Device Table is accessed using the device identifier as searching key to retrieve the last value 
of the frame counter received from that device. 
 The outgoing frame security procedure receives the unsecured frame, the security level, 
the Key Identifier Mode, the Key Source and the Key Index as input parameters, and secures 
the frame as specified by the security level, using the key identified by the pair (Key Source, 
Key Index) according to the key identifier mode. If the procedure succeeds, the resulting 
secured frame is returned for transmission. Notice that securing the frame consists in 
applying to the unsecured frame the cryptographic functions specified by the security level. 
The incoming frame security procedure receives the secured frame and, initially, parses it 
and determines the values of the security level, the key identifier mode, the Key Source and 
the Key Index as specified in the Auxiliary Security Header. Then, the procedure unsecures 
the frame, as specified by the security level, using the key identified by the pair (Key Source, 
Key Index) according to the key identifier mode. If the procedure succeeds, the resulting 
unsecured frame is returned for reception. Notice that unsecuring a frame also requires 
checking whether the received frame is a replay or not. The procedure accomplishes this 
check by accessing the Device Table specifying the sending node identifier as search key, 
retrieving the corresponding frame counter field value, and ascertaining that this value is 
smaller than that contained in the secured frame. 
3.2 THE CONET OPEN IMPLEMENTATION OF IEEE 802.15.4 
We have implemented a complete and fully operational version of the standard security sub-
layer within an open-source implementation of IEEE 802.15.4 maintained by the TinyOS 
IEEE 802.15.4 Working Group [38]. The whole standard, including the security sub-layer, 
has been implemented [22] in the nesC language for the TinyOS operating system on the 
Tmote Sky platform equipped with CC2420 chipset2. The security sub-layer implementation 
can be downloaded from [8]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first available free 
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 implementation of IEEE 802.15.4 including security services. All the experimental 
evaluations reported in this paper have been carried out on this implementation. 
4 EVALUATION 
In the presence of security, the network experiences performance degradation due to two 
sources of overhead, namely the communication overhead and the processing overhead. The 
communication overhead is due to the extra bits that are transmitted due to security, namely, 
the ASH and the MIC field (if present). The processing overhead is due to the extra 
processing introduced by the security procedures including parsing the ASH, looking up into 
tables as required by the standard procedures, and applying the cryptographic algorithms to 
secure/unsecure frames.  
19.09 (± 0.04)antify the impact of communication and processing overhead, we consider 
the following performance indices:  
 Latency (), defined as the interval of time between the instant at which the 
source node starts the frame transmission and the instant at which the same node 
receives the corresponding ACK. 
 Goodput (G), defined as  the amount of useful information bits correctly received 
by the PAN coordinator per unit of time. 
 Per-packet energy consumption (), defined as the total energy consumed by each 
sensor node divided by the number of data frames correctly delivered to the PAN 
coordinator. 
In the goodput definition we consider only the payload and not the whole frame in order 
to underline the impact of the security overhead on the transmission of the useful information 
carried by a MAC frame. The size of the payload field is always the same, irrespectively of 
 the security level used. As a consequence, goodput decreases when security increases. This 
effect will be quantified in the next sections. 
4.1 ANALYSIS 
In this section we evaluate analytically the impact of security services on the performance 
indices defined above. To this end, we consider a very simple network consisting of only two 
nodes, the PAN coordinator and a sensor node. In this setting, the sensor node always 
succeeds in accessing the wireless medium at the first attempt. This allows us to better 
understand the impact of security on performance. 
 
(a) Latency timeline without security 
 
(b) Latency timeline with security 
Figure 5. Slotted CSMA/CA timeline (a) without security and (b) with security 
4.1.1 Latency and goodput 
In order to model the impact of security on latency, we first derive latency in the absence of 
security and, then, we consider the effects of security. The average latency experienced by a 
frame consists of a number of components corresponding to the different steps of the 
 CSMA/CA algorithm (see Section 3). As shown in Figure 5-a , assuming that the sensor node 
starts in the idle state, latency can be computed as: 
  slot
2
 bck  2cca  tx  ack   
 [1]
 where 
 tx
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 slot   [2]
In Equation  [1], 2slot accounts for an average delay deriving from the fact that 
operations are aligned to a backoff slot, whose duration is equal to τslot; bck accounts for the 
random backoff time, which includes rxidle , the time necessary to switch the radio from the 
idle state to the receiving state; cca2  accounts for the time necessary to perform two 
consecutive Clear Channel Assessment operations; tx accounts for the total time required to 
actually transmit a frame; and, finally, ack  is the time to receive the corresponding ACK 
frame. In its turn, tx is equal to a whole number of backoff slots that contain the time interval 
τ
f
 + τ
tat
 (see Equation [2]), namely the frame transmission time τ
f 
to actually transmit a frame, 
and the turnaround time τ
tat
 to switch the radio from transmission mode to reception (and 
thus become able to receive the ACK frame). The turnaround time τ
tat
 to switch the radio 
from receive mode to transmission mode is part of the second τcca time interval. 
Security brings in two latency contributions: the security processing time which 
accounts for the security processing overhead, and the security communication time  
which accounts for the security communication overhead. The security processing 
time secproc accounts for the time required by security operations. The security communication 
 time accounts for the time necessary to transmit the additional fields brought about by 
security, namely the ASH and the MIC field (when present). The communication time 
has to be added to the frame transmission time  f .  With reference to Figure 5-b, it 
follows that Equation  [1] becomes: 
 
   procsec   slot2  bck  2 cca  tx
sec  ack [3] 
where 
 txsec   t  tat  com
sec
 slot




 slot  
     [4]
Once we have derived analytical formulas without and with security, we can easily 
calculate the goodput G experienced in both cases. Assuming that the sensor node has always 
a frame ready for transmission, the pattern shown in Figure 5-a and 5-b repeats for each 
following frame transmission. Hence:  
G  P   
[5]
and 
 
G  P sec  
[6]
 
4.1.2 Per-packet Energy Consumption 
Since we are assuming a network scenario with only two nodes and an ideal communication 
channel, the PAN coordinator receives all transmitted frames correctly. In addition, the 
transmission pattern for all frames is the same as the one shown in Figure 5. Hence, in order 
 
 to derive the per-packet energy consumption we can refer to a single frame transmission. 
Specifically, we sum the energy expenditures in every time interval contributing to latency 
(see Equation [3]). The energy ε consumed in an interval  is the product of the power w 
consumed in  and the time interval  itself, i.e.,   w .Power consumption can be derived 
from the device datasheet. 
In order to evaluate the per-packet energy consumption, we observe from Section 3.1.1 
that the processing overhead secproc  can be split into two components, namely the management 
overhead, mgmtsec , that accounts for frame parsing and tables lookup, and the encryption 
overhead, , that accounts for applying cryptographic algorithms to frames. The former 
component is implemented in software on the sensor node microcontroller. The latter 
component can be implemented both in software on the sensor node microcontroller or in 
hardware on the radio chipset, provided this device offers hardware support to cryptography. 
The CC2420 radio chipset available on Tmote Sky sensor nodes provides such a support [36].  
Whether cryptography is hardware-based (hw-based) or software-based (sw-based) may 
have a strong impact on performance for two reasons. Hardware-based encryption is faster 
than software-based encryption. On the other hand, hardware-based encryption is performed 
on the communication device that, generally, has larger power consumption than the 
microcontroller. In the rest of the paper we will evaluate performance in both cases. 
Furthermore, whether cryptography is hw-based or sw-based also influences the 
granularity at which we are able to evaluate parameter cryptosec .  The AES algorithm consists of 
a key scheduling algorithm and an encryption (decryption) algorithm. Key scheduling is 
performed just once, before encryption (decryption) starts, whereas the encryption 
(decryption) algorithm is performed on each plaintext (ciphertext) block. In the sw-based 
cryptography case, by properly instrumenting implementation, it is possible to separate the 
sec 
crypto  
 key scheduling overhead (  key,swsec ) from the per-block encryption (decryption) algorithm 
overhead ( block ,swsec ). In contrast, in the hw-based cryptography case this is not possible. It 
follows that the encryption processing overhead  cryptosec will be expressed in terms of a single 
parameter  crypto,hwsec in the hw-based  cryptography. In contrast, the encryption processing 
overhead  crypto,swsec in sw-based cryptography will be expressed in terms of two 
parameters, key,swsec and block,swsec . 
 4.1.3 Evaluation of parameters 
TABLE III. PARAMETERS.  
device Parameter 
duration 
(s) 
current 
(mA) 
power 
consumption 
(mW) 
energy 
consumption
(J) 
MPS430 
(v = 1.8V) 
Security management overhead 
( mgmtsec ) 
260 0.6 1.08 0.28 
Sw-based key scheduling overhead 
( key,swsec ) 
740 0.6 1.08 0.80 
Sw-based per-block cryptography 
overhead ( block ,swsec ) 
1630 0.6 1.08 1.76 
CC2420 
(v = 1.8V) 
Total hw-based cryptography 
overhead ( crypto,hwsec ) 
1393 21.19 [27] 38.14 53.13 
Average backoff period (bck) 1120 0.427 0.77 0.86 
Slot duration (slot) 320 0.427 0.77 0.25 
Idle-rx switching (idle-rx) 192 10.067 18.12 3.48 
Turnaround time (tat) 192 18.55 33.39 6.41 
Clear Channel Assessment (cca) 320 19.7 35.46 11.35 
Reception of ACK frame (ack) 352 19.7 35.46 12.48 
 
Table III shows the parameters values for calculating Equation [3], assuming that the 
communication chipset is CC2420 [36] and the microcontroller is MSP430 [31].  The values 
of absorbed current referring to MSP430 and CC2420 are taken from the respective 
datasheets. The only exception is the value of the absorbed current during  crypto,hwsec that has 
been taken from [27]. The absorbed current during τidle-rx has been obtained by averaging the 
 current absorbed in the idle state and the current absorbed in the receiving state. The current 
absorbed during turnaround time τ
tat
 has been estimated in a similar way (i.e., the mean value 
between the current absorbed in the receiving state and the current absorbed in the 
transmitting state). Please note that the approach we used to evaluate these currents is the 
same used by the Ns2 simulator to evaluate energy consumption [1][5].  
The duration of all delay components shown in Table III are derived from the standard, 
except for the values of mgmtsec ,  crypto,hwsec ,  key,swsec , and  block ,swsec that have been evaluated 
experimentally. Specifically, to measure these delays, we used two timers and properly 
instrumented our implementation of the standard (see Section 3.2). For the sw-based 
cryptography case, we used the software implementation of AES-128 algorithm that is 
available in the TinyOS repository [39]. In all cases, we fixed KeyIdMode3 and considered 
three different payload sizes, i.e., 2, 18, and 80 bytes. We measured the parameters for all 
possible combinations of security levels and payload sizes. For each measurement, we run an 
experiment consisting in sending 100 frames and then we took the average. Each experiment 
was repeated 10 times, in order to assure a better accuracy and measure the standard 
deviation.  
It is worthwhile to notice that timemgmtsec  (260.61  0.53 s) accounts for the management 
overhead due to frame parsing and tables lookup. This overhead is equal for both sw-based 
and hw-based cryptography and is independent of the frame size and the Security Level.  
Furthermore, in the case of hw-based cryptography, we found that, in practice,  crypto,hwsec  
(1393 s) is influenced by neither the payload size nor the security level. In principle, 
 crypto,hwsec  should depend on these parameters, which determine the actual number of blocks to 
be encrypted and/or authenticated. However, hw-based cryptography is so fast that its 
overhead is masked by the overhead for registers setup and device strobing. Finally, in sw-
 based cryptography, the key scheduling overhead  key,swsec  and the per-block encryption 
overhead  block ,swsec are not negligible and account to 740 μs and 1630 μs, respectively. It 
follows that, in contrast to hw-based cryptography, crypto,swsec now greatly depends on both the 
payload size and the security level. 
TABLE IV. FRAME EXPANSION DUE TO SECURITY (IN BYTES). 
 CTR CBC-MAC-4 
CCM-4 
CBC-MAC-8 
CCM-8 
CBC-MAC-16 
CCM-16 
KeyIdMode0 5 9 13 21 
KeyIdMode1 6 10 14 22 
KeyIdMode2 10 14 18 26 
KeyIdMode3 14 18 22 30 
 
Table IV shows the frame expansion in bytes as a function of the security level and the 
key identifier mode. Such an expansion is due to the ASH and the MIC, if present. The size 
of the former depends on the KeyIdMode (see Section 3.1) whereas the size of the latter 
depends on the security level (see Section 3.1).  
4.1.4 Analytical results 
In this section we show the trends of latency, goodput and energy consumption as functions 
of the security level. In this analysis, we consider the KeyIdMode3 that, for each security 
level, causes the largest ASH, therefore the largest frame expansion and thus represents the 
worst case from the communication viewpoint. We evaluate the trends in the case of both 
hw-based and sw-based cryptography for three different values of the payload, namely 2 
bytes, which features a small payload; 18 bytes, which features a realistic payload; and, 
finally, 80 bytes, which features the largest payload when the MIC and ASH have the largest 
size.  
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Figure 6. Latency, goodput and per-packet energy consumption (hw-based cryptography). 
Figure 6 shows the trend of latency, goodput, and per-packet energy consumption with 
security levels, for different payload sizes, in KeyIdMode3, when using hardware-based 
cryptography. As it turns out, the main performance penalty occurs when we move from 
unsecured (NO-SEC) to secured traffic. However, a variation of the security level causes 
little, almost negligible, variations in the security cost. Consider latency for example. 
Switching from NO-SEC to CTR, causes latency to increase by the 57% in the case of 2 
bytes payload, 49% in the case of 18 bytes payload, and 35% in the case of 80 bytes payload. 
However, switching from CTR to CCM-16 causes just a latency increase of 12%, 11%, and 
8%, respectively. As to goodput, switching from NO-SEC to CTR causes a decrement of 
36% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 33% in the case of 18-bytes payload, and 26% in that of 
80-bytes payload. However, switching from CTR to CCM-16 causes a further decrement of 
just 11% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 10% in the case of 18-bytes payload, and 7% in that 
of 80-bytes payload. Finally, as to energy consumption, switching from NO-SEC to CTR 
causes an increment of 89% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 71% in the case of 18-bytes 
payload, and 45% in that of 80-bytes payload. However, switching from CTR to CCM-16 
causes a further increment of just 15% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 13% in the case of 18-
bytes payload, and 5% in that of 80-bytes payload. 
 It is interesting to observe that, in some cases, a change in the security level that causes a 
frame size increment does not reflect in a latency increase. For instance, consider the 80-byte 
payload curve. Switching from CCM-4 (CBC-MAC-4) to CCM-8 (CBC-MAC-8) does not 
cause any latency change even though the latter implies transmitting 4 bytes more than the 
former. This is because the increase in the transmission time due to the increased frame size 
is hidden by the backoff alignment, as expressed by Equation [4]. Similar considerations hold 
for goodput and energy consumption. 
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Figure 7: Latency, goodput and energy consumption (sw-based cryptography). 
 
Figure 7 shows the trend of latency, goodput, and per-packet energy consumption with 
the security levels for different payload sizes, in KeyIdMode3, when using software-based 
cryptography. Similarly to the previous case (i.e. hardware-based cryptography), a 
performance penalty occurs when we move from unsecured (NO-SEC) to secured traffic. 
However, in contrast to the previous case, variations in the security level (or payload size) 
cause considerable variations in the security cost. Actually, as discussed in Section 4.1.3, the 
security level determines the number of block encryption/decryption operations whose 
delays, in the case of sw-based cryptography, are not negligible.   
For example, switching from NO-SEC to CTR, causes latency to increase considerably 
by the 86% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 112% in the case of 18-bytes payload, and 158% 
 in the case of 80-bytes payload. However, switching from CTR to CBC-MAC causes latency 
to increase by about 30% in the case of 2-bytes payload, about 23% in the case of 18-byes 
payload and, finally, about 24% in the case of 80-bytes payload. Finally, switching from CTR 
to CCM causes latency to increase by about 80% in the case of 2-bytes payload, about 79% 
in the case of 18-byes payload and, finally, about 87% in the case of 80-bytes payload. 
Goodput has a dual behaviour. Switching from NO-SEC to CTR causes a goodput 
decrement of 46% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 52% in the case of 18-bytes payload, and 
61% in that of 80-bytes payload. Goodput further decreases upon switching to CBC-MAC 
and CCM.  
Finally, as to per-packet energy consumption, switching from NO-SEC to CTR causes an 
increment of 18% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 16% in the case of 18-bytes payload, and 
13% in that of 80-bytes payload. Furthermore, switching from CTR to CCM-16 causes a 
further increment of 15% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 13% in the case of 18-bytes payload, 
and, finally, 9% in the case of 80-bytes payload. 
It turns out that the per-packet energy consumption is the only metric that improves upon 
moving from hw-based to sw-based cryptography. For instance, if we consider the CCM-16 
security level, latency increases by 44% in the case of 2-bytes payload, 137% in the case of 
18-bytes payload, and 235% in the case of 80-bytes payload. Consistently, goodput decreases 
by 50%, 58%, and 70%, respectively. In contrast, per-packet energy increases by 29%, 24%, 
and 14%, respectively. The reason is that, while performing cryptographic operations, 
MSP430 absorbs much less power than CC2420. Actually, from Table III it turns out that 
both devices operates at 1.08 V but MSP430 absorbs 0.6 mA whereas CC2420 absorbs 
21.19 mA, a current, and thus a power that is about 35 times larger than the former. As a 
consequence, even though sw-based encryption is slower than hw-based encryption, the 
overall energy consumed by the former is smaller than that consumed by the latter. 
 4.1.5 Experimental validation of the analytical model 
The analytical model has been validated through experimental measurements on a real 
testbed. The experimental testbed consisted of Tmote Sky sensor nodes [31], equipped with a 
MSP430 microcontroller, 10 Kbytes of RAM, 48 Kbytes of ROM and, finally, a CC2420 
radio transceiver. CC2420 is compliant with the IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer and supports a 
250 Kbit/s bit rate over an unlicensed 2.4 GHz ISM band [36]. As to system software, sensor 
nodes run the TinyOS 2.x operating system (available from http://www.tinyos.net/) and the 
CONET open-source implementation of IEEE 802.15.4 (Section 3.2). 
To validate the analytical results derived in previous section, we considered only two 
sensor nodes, KeyIdMode3 and a payload size equal to 18 bytes.  
TABLE V. EXPERIMENTAL VS ANALYTICAL LATENCY. VALUES ARE IN MS. 
SecLevel 
Hw-based cryptography Sw-based cryptography 
Experimental Analytical Experimental Analytical 
NO-SEC 4.28 (± 0.14) 4.06 4.28 (± 0.14) 4.06 
CTR 6.35 (± 0.13) 6.04 9.08 (± 0.16) 8.64 
CBC-MAC-4 6.57 (± 0.18) 6.04 10.83 (± 0.16) 10.27 
CCM-4 6.51 (± 0.17) 6.04 16.51 (± 0.16) 15.16 
CBC-MAC-8 6.62 (± 0.13) 6.36 11.25 (± 0.14) 10.59 
CCM-8 6.79 (± 0.22) 6.36 16.62 (± 0.16) 15.48 
CBC-MAC-16 6.95 (± 0.22) 6.68 11.43 (± 0.16) 10.91 
CCM-16 6.99 (± 0.20) 6.68 16.75 (± 0.17) 15.80 
 
 TABLE VI. EXPERIMENTAL VS ANALYTICAL GOODPUT . VALUES ARE IN KBIT/S 
SecLevel 
 Hw-based cryptography Sw-based cryptography 
Experimental Analytical Experimental Analytical 
NO-SEC 33.62 (± 1.1) 35.43 33.62 (± 1.1) 35.43 
CTR 22.69 (± 0.47) 23.85 15.86 (± 0.26) 16.66 
CBC-MAC-4 21.90 (± 0.59) 23.85 13.30 (± 0.20) 14.02 
CCM-4 22.12 (± 0.58) 23.85 8.72 (± 0.13) 9.50 
CBC-MAC-8 21.77 (± 0.43) 22.65 12.80 (± 0.15) 13.59 
CCM-8 21.20 (± 0.69) 22.65 8.67 (± 0.14) 9.30 
CBC-MAC-16 20.71 (± 0.63) 21.57 12.60 (± 0.18) 13.19 
CCM-16 20.60 (± 0.58) 21.57 8.60 (± 0.09) 9.11 
 
Table V and Table VI show the analytical and experimental measurements for latency 
and goodput, for different Security Levels, when using hw-based and sw-based cryptography, 
respectively. The experimental measurements are fully consistent with the analytical results. 
Furthermore, they completely confirm the trends observed in Section 4.1.4. As far as hw-
based cryptography, a significant variation in performance occurs when we proceed from 
unsecured to secured frames. However, the security level has little, if not negligible, 
influence on performance. When using software-based cryptography, the performance loss is 
greater than in the case of hw-based cryptography and strongly depends on the number of 
block encryption operations and thus, ultimately, on the payload size and the security level.  
4.2 SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
In the previous analysis, we have considered a network composed of two nodes. This allows 
us to understand the impact of security when there is no contention between sensor nodes. In 
this section we consider a more complex, but more realistic, scenario composed by more 
nodes.  
 We consider a star, beacon-enabled PAN composed of a coordinator and a variable 
number of ordinary sensor nodes that are placed in a circle around the sink node, 10 m far 
from it. Upon receiving a beacon frame, an ordinary node attempts, until it succeeds, to 
transmit a frame to the coordinator. The Beacon Interval is 983.04 ms (BO = 6 and SO = 6). 
In order to evaluate the impact of security on performance, we simulated the considered 
scenario by means of the Ns2 simulation tool [37]. The basic IEEE 802.15.4 model has been 
extended to take into account delays due to security, i.e.,  procsec  and  commsec . The former was 
modelled as a pure delay. The latter has been implemented by fictitiously enlarging the 
payload by a quantity specified in Table IV for each relevant pair (security level, 
KeyIdMode).  In simulations, we only considered KeyIdMode3. Furthermore, we set the 
transmission range to 15 m and the carrier sensing range to 30 m as in [3]. In addition, we 
considered an 18-bytes payload corresponding to a total unsecured frame size of 33 bytes. 
We derived simulation results for both hw-based and sw-based cryptography. 
For each simulation, we have performed 10 independent replications, each consisting of 
1000 Beacon Intervals. The presented results are averaged over the ten replications. For each 
repetition, we discarded the initial transient period during which nodes associate to the PAN 
coordinator before starting generating data packets. We also derived confidence intervals 
considering a 95% confidence level. 
Figure 8. Simulation results for latency, goodput, and energy consumption (hw-based cryptography). 
 As to hw-based cryptography, Figure 8 shows the simulation trend of latency, goodput, 
and per-packet energy consumption with the number of nodes for each security level. 
Confidence intervals are so small that they cannot be graphically appreciated.  
As above, we validated our simulation results through experimental measurements. Table 
VII compares the simulation and experimental results (and the corresponding confidence 
intervals), for latency and goodput with two and ten nodes. As it turns out, simulation and 
experimental results agree with each other.  
 
TABLE VII. LATENCY AND GOODPUT: EXPERIMENTAL VS SIMULATION RESULTS (HW-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY) 
 
SecLevel 
Latency (ms) Goodput (kbit/s) 
 Experimental Simulation Experimental Simulation  
2 nodes 
NO-SEC 4.28 (± 0.14) 3.42 (± 0.01) 33.62 (± 1.1) 35.44 (± 0.0) 
CTR 6.35 (± 0.13) 5.98 (± 0.01) 22.69 (± 0.47) 24.07 (± 0.0) 
CBC-MAC-4 6.57 (± 0.18) 5.98 (± 0.01) 21.90 (± 0.59) 24.07 (± 0.0) 
CCM-4 6.51 (± 0.17) 5.98 (± 0.01) 22.12  (± 0.58) 24.07 (± 0.0) 
CBC-MAC-8 6.62 (± 0.13) 6.30 (± 0.01) 21.77  (± 0.43) 22.84 (± 0.0) 
CCM-8 6.79 (± 0.22) 6.30 (± 0.01) 21.20  (± 0.69) 22.84 (± 0.0) 
CBC-MAC-16 6.95 (± 0.22) 6.30 (± 0.01) 20.71 (± 0.63) 22.84 (± 0.0) 
CCM-16 6.99 (± 0.20) 6.30 (± 0.01) 20.60 (± 0.58) 22.84 (± 0.0) 
10 nodes 
NO-SEC 13.12 (± 0.14) 12.47 (± 0.03) 29.34 (± 0.96) 30.76 (± 0.05) 
CTR 19.14 (± 0.58) 19.84 (± 0.03) 21.40 (± 0.45) 19.03 (± 0.02) 
CBC-MAC-4 19.71 (± 0.61) 19.85 (± 0.03) 21.44 (± 0.57) 19.09 (± 0.04) 
CCM-4 19.51 (± 0.54) 19.85 (± 0.03) 20.66 (± 0.54) 19.09 (± 0.04) 
CBC-MAC-8 19.43 (± 0.43) 20.54 (± 0.04) 20.55 (± 0.41) 17.12 (± 0.02) 
CCM-8 20.10 (± 0.37) 20.54 (± 0.04) 20.40 (± 0.66) 17.12 (± 0.02) 
CBC-MAC-16 19.41 (± 0.50) 20.69 (± 0.05) 20.05 (± 0.61) 16.92 (± 0.04) 
CCM-16 20.33 (± 0.53) 20.69 (± 0.05) 18.58 (± 0.52) 16.92 (± 0.04) 
 
 At first glance, we may observe that, in accordance with the previous analysis, for any given 
number of nodes, switching from unsecured to secured traffic causes a neat performance loss 
due to the security processing and communication overhead. However, the specific security 
level has little, or even no, influence on such a loss. Going into more details, let us consider 
the trend of latency (Figure 8-a). For each security level, latency increases with the number of 
nodes. This depends on the fact that, when the number of nodes increases, it is more likely 
that a node attempting to transmit has to wait for the free medium. Also, the probability of 
collisions increases and, hence, some frames have to be retransmitted. However, it turns out 
that the latency in the case of secured traffic grows, with the number of nodes, more quickly 
than that of unsecured traffic. Actually, curves tend to diverge. This depends on the 
additional delays deriving from the security processing and communication overhead that 
every transmitting node brings in. Due to this additional delay, ceteris paribus, in the case of 
secured traffic, on average, a node experiences a latency longer than that in the case of 
unsecured traffic. Goodput has a dual trend (Figure 8-b), with respect to latency.  
Similar considerations also apply to the energy consumption per delivered packet (Figure 
8-c). The increasing trend is more remarkable than latency because not only the total energy 
consumption increases with the number of sensor nodes, but the percentage of delivered 
frames decreases, as emphasized by the goodput decrease in Figure 8-b. 
 
   
Figure 9: Simulation results for latency, goodput, and per-packet energy consumption (sw-based 
cryptography) 
 As to sw-based cryptography, Figure 9 shows the trend of latency, goodput, and per-
packet energy consumption with the number of nodes for each security level. As above, 
confidence intervals are so small that they cannot be graphically appreciated. 
As expected, Figure 9 shows that switching from unsecured to secured traffic causes a 
performance loss. Furthermore, the figure also shows that payload size and security level 
have influence on such a loss, due to the number of block encryption operations that are 
required.  However, Figure 9-c shows that per-packet energy consumption constitutes an 
exception and as its trend is very similar to that in hw-based cryptography (Figure 8-c). This 
is because, with respect to hw-based cryptography, sw-based cryptography increases the 
encryption processing overhead (  cryptosec ) but, at the same time, requires a lower power 
consumption. 
As in the previous case, we validated our simulation results through experimental 
measurements. Again, we observed a general agreement between simulation and 
experimental results. We omit them for the sake of space. 
4.3 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF MEMORY OVERHEAD 
In this section we evaluate, through an experimental analysis carried out with the testbed 
described in Section 4.1.5, the memory overhead introduced by the IEEE 802.15.4 security 
sub-layer. 
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Figure 10. ROM memory overhead: a) hw-based cryptography; b) sw-based cryptography. 
Figure 10 shows the ROM footprint breakdown on both the PAN coordinator and a 
regular sensor node. With hw-based cryptography (Figure 10-a), the amount of memory 
required by the security sub-layer executable is the 11.58% of the overall memory available 
on the PAN coordinator, and the 12.96% on a regular sensor node. In both cases, most of the 
memory used is taken by the IEEE 802.15.4 implementation (i.e. the original communication 
stack). Note also that 19.46% (15.44%) of memory on the PAN coordinator (regular node) 
remains available for other uses (e.g., applications). With sw-based cryptography (Figure 10-
b), the amount of memory required by the security sub-layer executable is the 17.36% of the 
overall memory available on the PAN coordinator, and the 18.76% on a regular sensor node. 
In both cases, most of the memory occupancy is due to the IEEE 802.15.4 implementation 
and software implementation of the encryption algorithm. Also note that 13.68% (9.66%) of 
memory on the PAN coordinator (regular node) remains available for other uses (e.g., 
applications). 
  
Figure 11. RAM memory overhead 
However, the space necessary to allocate the TinyOS image is not the only storage cost 
that we have to pay in order to use the security sub-layer. As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the 
security sub-layer requires data structures, e.g., the Device Table and the Key Table, that are 
allocated in RAM and whose size grows with the number of nodes and keys. Figure 11 shows 
the trend of RAM occupancy on the PAN coordinator when the number of nodes grows. In 
the case of hw-based cryptography, nine sender nodes require about 3858 bytes of RAM. 
Beyond this threshold, we experimentally observe that motes hang or behave erratically.  
In the case of sw-based cryptography, we have to allocate in RAM also the data 
structures of the AES encryption algorithm, which account for about 1 Kbytes. It follows that 
the threshold is crossed with a smaller number of nodes, namely four.      
With TinyOS/msp430-gcc, there is no limit, but the physical capacity, to the amount of 
memory that a software component may use. However, it is not recommended to fill up the 
entire RAM with the component variables, because TinyOS needs space for the stack. There 
is no straightforward way to calculate the amount of memory TinyOS needs. However, as a 
rule of thumb, you have better leave at least 500 byte, or maybe 1 Kbytes, empty. Otherwise 
you can get a stack overflow and the mote will hang or do erratic things. 
 Of course, we cannot exclude that a more efficient implementation than ours may get a 
higher threshold. However, regardless the actual value of the threshold, the important point to 
capture here is that in memory scarce devices, the amount of memory necessary for security 
data structures may constitute a limit to the overall system scalability.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a performance evaluation of the IEEE 802.15.4 security sub-layer. We 
have shown that security mechanisms and options, as provided by the standard, cause the 
increase of frame length (communication overhead) and require additional computations 
(computing overhead) for security processing. These sources of overhead have an impact on 
the overall WSN performance in terms of latency, goodput, and memory performance. More 
precisely, we have obtained the following results. First, we have shown the relationship 
between the computing and communication overhead and the security parameters, namely 
security level and key identification mode.  In addition, we have shown that the highest cost 
has to be paid when we switch from unsecured to secured communication. However, when 
data frames are secured via hardware, the chosen security service has little, or even 
negligible, impact on performance. In contrast, when traffic is secured via software, both the 
chosen security service and the payload size have a considerable impact on performance. 
Differently from previous work [14], we have proposed a simple yet effective analytical 
model that we have used to extend an Ns2-based simulator of IEEE 802.15.4. The model and 
the extended simulator have been experimentally validated. Finally, we have evaluated the 
memory overhead of the security sub-layer and, consequently, we have argued that this 
overhead may pose a fundamental limit to the WSN scalability. We believe that our work can 
allow designers and implementers to find the best trade-off between security and 
performance in the application scenario at hand. 
 We would like to spend a final remark on IEEE Std 802.15.4e, an amendment of IEEE 
802.15.4-2011, which adds functionalities to the standard in order to support time constrained 
applications (e.g. in the industrial domain) and permit compatibility with Chinese 
WPANs [21]. This amendment potentially impacts our work in two ways. First of all, the 
amendment introduces optional changes to the MAC model. Second, still optionally, the 
amendment makes it possible to remove the Frame Counter field as well as increase its size 
from four to five bytes. However, we point out the following remarks. First, an evaluation of 
the impact of security on the performance of IEEE 802.15.4e would require an analytical and 
simulation model of the amended standard. While this is clearly outside the scope of this 
paper, we claim that the methodology introduced in this paper would remain valid. Second, 
all the amendments introduced by IEEE Std 802.15.4e are optional. Therefore, our arguments 
retain their full validity in the default case. Finally, the IEEE 802.15.4e does not introduce 
any meaningful change in the security sub-layer, but the possible different size of the Frame 
Counter field. Hence, the security cost model can be extended to encompass these changes as 
well.  
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